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Lyon: Protecting Patients’ Autonomy

Protecting Patients’ Autonomy: Supporting the “Right to Die”
By Nicholas Lyon
As medical techniques have increased in complexity, death can be delayed more and
more, and the debate over euthanasia has become increasingly important. Patients with chronic
ailments such as AIDS or cancer can now receive treatments that allow them to survive for far
longer than what was possible even only a few decades ago. Through the use of modern genetic
analysis tools, companies like 23andMe have allowed people of all ages to know what diseases
and infirmities they are prone to long before the onset of symptoms. Despite these advancements
however, society’s definition of “survive” remains purely having the body’s mechanical
processes continue, and fails to incorporate the patient’s suffering and quality of life into the
discussion. Due to the intrinsically subjective nature of such complaints from a patient, the
critical factor to be considered in the ethics of requests to die will be how the patient views their
suffering and quality of life, not the observations of third parties. In this essay I will argue that if
a patient makes a considered request to die rather than suffer prolonged physical or mental
agony, then those who have the capability to do so should honor that request. I further argue that
such an action is entirely morally justifiable. For the purposes of this essay I will use euthanasia
to mean “directly or indirectly bringing about the death of another person for that person’s sake,”
with passive euthanasia being synonymous with “letting die” and active euthanasia involving a
direct action.1
When using the term ‘suffer’ most people understand what is meant, but when pressed
can only present examples from their own lives with complete certainty. With respect to the loss
of a loved one, for example, it is generally agreed that ‘everyone mourns differently,’ in that
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some people may outwardly show no change but internally be dealing with the complex
emotions such an event can bring up. It can be extremely challenging to guess exactly what
anyone is feeling at a given time, and impossible to definitively ‘know’ even if the person
attempts to relay his or her feelings to you. In addition, for the person suffering there is little
difference between mental anguish and physical agony. To the sufferer, severe depression is just
as real as a broken arm, despite the heavy societal emphasis placed upon physical suffering.
Because pain can be physical or mental, or both, and to the sufferer the origin of that pain can be
irrelevant, it is remiss not to consider prolonged mental anguish as an equally valid reason to ask
for euthanasia as physical pain is.
The obvious fear here is that people with mental disorders that cause them to ‘feel’
emotions more (e.g. bipolar disorder, depression, etc.), and hormone-filled teenagers will, in a
flight of dramatic passion, plead to be freed from the trauma and tragedies of life. It is tempting
for outside observers to refuse such a request because we ‘know’ it gets better. As described
earlier however, it is not possible for anyone to definitively know that, as the best such observers
can truly do is compare the sufferer’s current situation to something that they lived through. This
does not mean that these observers have any idea of the level of suffering another person can
bear or that they have a right to force the victim to live through to the better days the patient may
fail to see. As bioethicist John Lachs explains, “It would indeed be tragic if medicine were to
leap to the aid of lovelorn teenagers whenever they feel life is too much to bear. But it is just as
lamentable to stand idly by and watch unwanted lives fill up with unproductive pain.2” Such a
premise is applicable to any demographic group suffering mental anguish. It is often more
palatable to discuss physical suffering in regards to euthanasia as a treatment for persistent pain,
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so subsequent examples in this essay will revolve around the corporeal, but it should not be
forgotten that mental and physical anguish are often interchangeable when viewed from the
perspective of the sufferer.
There are many factors that are called into question when considering the validity of a
request for euthanasia, and several of these fail to account for the goal of such an act: to end
prolonged suffering. Typically the age of the patient is associated with the validity of a request
for euthanasia because of a misinterpreted link between age and experience. This inequity only
becomes clear in practice. In the abstract, one might well agree with bioethicist Lewis Vaughn
that in the case of a terminal patient “if her pain is unbearable and untreatable, and she makes an
autonomous request to die, then active euthanasia may be a blessing—and therefore within
ethical bounds,” regardless of who “she” is in this case.3 However, in practical examples,
distinctions are made often based solely on age. Consider an 80-year-old person suffering from
cancer who tells a doctor that his suffering is too great and asks for euthanasia to end the agony.
If it were legal, such as in Oregon and Washington, the state would likely respect this request as
legitimate, leaving aside the responsibility of the doctor for the moment. On the other hand,
consider a child of 10 who contracted HIV in the womb and subsequently developed AIDS. If
this person made the same request of a doctor, the state would likely argue that the killing of this
child would be neither legal nor moral, regardless of the patient’s wealth of experience with
suffering. This argument would likely be couched in an argument pertaining to the innocence of
youth, coupled with an insistence that a child does not have the mental capacity to make such a
choice. Assume then that the child’s request is denied, as the child grows, when would he be able
to exercise the right to ask for an end to suffering through euthanasia? At 16 when the state trusts
him behind the wheel of a potentially extremely dangerous machine? At 18 when he can vote or
3
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21 when he can drink? These ages seem arbitrary (a distinction reflected by their international
and state-level variances), and as the state delays for some pseudo-significant age the patient has
no choice but to wait for his illness to do the moral thing and kill him, and by so doing, free him
of his agony.
Because of the emotional nature of these kinds of questions, it is helpful to consider an
analogous situation to more objectively address the issues at hand. Imagine a hunter walking in
the forest who sees someone being mauled to death by a bear. The bear cannot be killed or
driven away, and the hunter sees that he can shoot this person and save him the agony of being
brutally killed. Regardless of what you think the moral course of action would be, it is clear that
the demographic identity of the victim has no place in the hunter’s decision. It would not further
complicate the hunter’s choice if the person being mauled to death were male or female, young
or old, poor or rich, simply because they are being made to suffer terrible agony before they will
assuredly die. Now imagine the victim sees the hunter and begs to be shot and therefore spared
continued suffering. To stand by and do nothing at that point would certainly be morally wrong,
and as Lachs points out, “In the end, our lives belong to no one but ourselves.4” This statement
again holds true without the caveat of ‘unless you’re a child,’ and can be extended to medical
applications. Even if the hunter in this situation was also a bear expert and knew the bear would
leave without killing the victim, the pleas of the person being mauled to death would still
supersede the objective knowledge of the hunter that the person would ultimately ‘survive’.
The other issue this analogy raises, however, is the contentious point of whether or not
medical professionals should be required to actively assist patients who wish to die. Opponents
of euthanasia argue that, “medicine should limit its domain to promoting and preserving human
health,” and should not begin to enter into the relief of “suffering which stems from life itself,
4
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not merely from a sick body.5” I would argue that medical institutions have never been purely
about healing the injured and curing the sick; doctors work towards developing a positive
‘bedside manner’ and have for centuries sought to help their patients and the families of their
patients emotionally cope with the news of disease or other tragedy. In this way, doctors have
always been responsible for handling the suffering of their patients. True, this relief of suffering
does not typically include helping the patient die to avoid further suffering, but if death is
assured and suffering will be a constant until that time, a quick death seems to be the last resort
that a doctor can provide for her patients to relieve their pain.
Also, as with many bioethical issues, intention matters. If euthanasia were allowed by
society for the purpose of relieving the anguish of terminal patients, where death is only the end
result rather than the goal, it does not follow that society would respect life any less (as is often
insinuated by opponents of euthanasia). If a policy were instituted to control these decisions,
extensive checks and balances within the system could control for such a distinction. The moral
arguments here do not culminate in a suggestion of over-the-counter cyanide pills available at
every chain grocery store. The issue of when it is, or is not, acceptable to pursue euthanasia as a
viable choice for the end of suffering should never be taken lightly, and it seems unlikely that it
will be even if the arguments and conclusions of this paper are accepted and drastically
expanded. It is more likely that society would become more compassionate as the limitation of
an individual’s mental or physical suffering became a higher priority than the brute preservation
of the mechanical functions of the heart and brain.
Even when this argument is taken to an extreme, and a legalization of euthanasia with
few limits is suggested, what actually happens in places that have legalized euthanasia flies in the
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face of the fears of those who argue against euthanasia on principle. A definitive study conducted
by Margaret Battin in 2007 in Oregon and the Netherlands on legalized euthanasia found “no
evidence” that legalized doctor-assisted suicide lead to increased rates of abuse of the system,
and furthermore that even “people with psychiatric illness—including depression and
Alzheimer’s disease—are not likely to die in lopsided numbers.6” Opponents of euthanasia often
argue that if doctors could assist their patients in dying they would begin to lose sight of the
value of human life and perhaps even mete out death as they saw fit due to some narcissistic
overestimation of their power. The Netherlands legalized euthanasia and has long been touted for
the compassion of its doctors and the careful and considered way in which they approach all
requests for euthanasia, and the data collected thus far do not tell a tale of brutality and abuse. In
the abstract as well, if euthanasia is viewed as a relief of critical suffering and not the ending of
someone’s life, then it is not likely to be ‘abused’ because of the compassion necessary to
understand the patient’s motives in making such a decision.
Another issue raised is the relationship between a patient’s description of his own
suffering and the course of action taken by a doctor. The gray area lies in the point at which a
patient’s suffering merits death as a tool to relieve that suffering. Fortunately, “Physicians have
developed considerable skill in relating subjective complaints to objective conditions,7” and this
skill is as applicable to euthanasia as it is to any routine ailment common in hospitals today. In
some cases doctors need not be involved in the actual act, as Lachs suggests, “Even limited
access to deadly drugs, restricted to single doses for those who desire them and who are certified
to be of sound mind and near the end of life, would keep physicians away from dealing in
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death.8” This method would only be applicable to patients able to minister to their own needs, so
patients physically or emotionally unable to take advantage of this option would still fall to the
responsibility of medical professionals.
There are good reasons for medical professionals to have the responsibility for end-of-life
decisions, and the best of these is also the most obvious: physicians already have an intimate and
extensive knowledge of the most painless and most efficient ways to effectively euthanize
patients in need of such a service. Oncologist Timothy Quill, faced with a patient’s desire to die
instead of undergoing the trauma and pain of chemotherapy, said after his patient’s death,
“Although I did not assist in her suicide directly, I helped indirectly to make it possible,
successful, and relatively painless.9” It is important to remember that in this landmark case, Quill
did not take this decision lightly and over the months that he and his patient talked about possible
alternatives he became a close friend of both his patient and her family. When she did decide to
take her life equipped with the knowledge from her doctor of how much of a certain drug she
needed to take, she visited Quill and informed him and her family of her final decision before
taking a dignified exit from life. This example provides implicit support for the idea that
terminally ill patients have the right to request euthanasia before the onset of serious symptoms.
This is only applicable to patients who will certainly die and will otherwise experience horrific
agony due to their illness or the treatment of it before that time. For any terminal patients
suffering such an illness, if a physician decides to take a moral stance against actively
euthanizing them and opts instead to simply ‘allow them to die,’ that action is less moral than
forcing a treatment upon this patient. As bioethicist James Rachels argues, “The process of being
‘allowed to die’ can be relatively slow and painful, whereas being given a lethal injection is
Lachs, 1994.
Quill, T. E. (1991). Death and dignity: A case of individualized decision making. In L. Vaughn
(Ed.),Bioethics: Principles, issues, and cases (2nd ed., pp. 610-613). New York: Oxford University Press.
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quick and painless.10” It seems clear that allowing a patient to suffer for even more than a
moment longer than necessary is the mark of a physician who has become truly hardened to the
value of a human life with inherent worth and dignity.
My personal motivation for writing so extensively on this topic out of all the heavily
debated ethical issues in the world today is also the reason why legal decisions revolving around
end-of-life issues are especially pertinent to me. My family has a long history with Alzheimer’s
disease and growing up I often heard stories of my great-grandparents battling with the onset of
dementia and the loss of their most prized memories. My father was also recently diagnosed with
Parkinson’s disease, and my maternal grandfather died only a few years ago of advanced
pancreatic cancer. A few decades ago, the worst I would be able to say about how these illnesses
would be able to effect me personally would be that I could have a genetic proclivity towards
these afflictions, but I would only know for sure if I would express those traits when symptoms
began to appear in my late 50s or 60s. Due to the development of personal genetic tests offered
by companies like 23andMe, I now have an intimate knowledge of all of the secrets that my
genetics hold. For myself I have an elevated risk (meaning some of the known genetic markers
were present) of Parkinson’s, Alzheimer’s, and both esophageal and stomach cancer—among
other, less lethal—ailments.
To know all of this at 20 is something that no other generation has ever been able to do,
and despite the several decades of life between now and when the symptoms of these diseases
could set in, it certainly changes my outlook on life in general and certainly my views on
discussions around euthanasia. With Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s especially, because neither of
these diseases actually kill their patients, I am forced to consider what I would (or potentially
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will) do when that decision becomes applicable. I don’t know if I would choose to be euthanized,
and I don’t think I necessarily have to know this early on, but I do know that if someone close to
me told me they intended to be euthanized I would have no choice but to respect their decision,
even if my love for that person made such a decision almost unimaginably hard for me
personally.
The issues surrounding euthanasia are by no means easily resolved, and though much of
both this paper and arguments against euthanasia operate mainly in the abstract, each case of
euthanasia is unique. A standardized system for euthanasia would have to reflect this complexity
and would likely come into frequent debate if it were ever instituted. These potential logistical
problems should not overly complicate the issue however, because it is well worth any time
spent debating this question, and others like it, if people who endure constant suffering can have
even a slim chance for the relief of their pain. Whether their pain is mental or physical, if
euthanasia is the only option they see as an escape, then they should be permitted this reprieve
regardless of the views of the society in which they live. These requests should not be taken
lightly, and in some ways the debate around euthanasia ensures that they never will be, which is
undoubtedly for the best. I strongly believe that people continuing to have these discussions—in
both formal and informal settings—can only help make policies better at ending purposeless
suffering, and that gives me great hope for my future decision. Patients asking to die is never
easy, but the cleanest principle I have been able to articulate thus far for medical institutions to
follow in these cases is this: do everything possible to make sure that patients are kept able to
live rather than simply alive, and when they are ready to die, help them to make that action as
painless as possible.
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